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Abstract
We show that in long repeated games - or in infinitely repeated games
with discount rate close to one- payoffs corresponding to evolutionary
stable sets are asymptotically efficient, as intuition suggests. Actions
played at the beginning of the game are used as messages that al-
low players to coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes in the following
stages. Strategies following some simple and intuitive ”behavioral
maxims” are shown to be able to drive out inefficient ones from a
population. The result builds a bridge between the theory of repeated
games and that of communication games that will be further investi-
gated.
∗To contact me please send an email at sdm.golem@gmail.com
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1 Introduction
Consider the (doubly symmetric) game.
( A B
A 10 0
B 0 1
)
(1.1)
and suppose you ask a friend, unacquainted with game theory, how two
reasonable persons would play it. The likely reply would be that the obvious
choice for both is A. In order to defend the usefulness of the solution concepts
you have learnt, you may come out with a story to convince her that, in some
cases, (B,B) could also be a conceivable outcome. To make the story short,
suppose that she agrees that some “brutish power which, hidden, holds sway
to common evil”1, let’s call it Momus, has convinced both players to play
B, because ”‘This is what your coplayer will play because she believes that
everybody does so. You cannot talk to her to change this convention. So if
you play A you will get 0 instead of one”’. And, of course, if the the game
where just a less symmetric one, such as,
( A B
A 10 0
B 8 7
)
(1.2)
Momus’s endeavors would be less toilsome. He would perfidiously remark
that A may be an obvious choice but is certainly a risky one: because of the
asymmetry of payoffs miscoordination will be more harmful to the A player
than to the B player.
In either game, however, Momus’s victory over common good (and maybe
common sense, too) depends crucially on the lack of communication between
players: if they could speak before the game they would be able to overcome
their fears and agree on the “obvious” outcome 2.
But now your friend, deeply convinced that humans have a natural ten-
dency to explore how poor cooperation may be improved, would point out
that even without explicit communication the players could fool Momus and
end up playing A. “Suppose”, she would say “ that they meet each other
very frequently and that the game is played at every meeting - as is often
1“brutto poter che ascoso al commun danno impera”
2Game theory can be used to show this rigorously, as done in [16] and [9].
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the case in real life - then, even if your Momus told them to play B all the
time and even if communication is impossible, at some point they will switch
to A, to their mutual advantage” “Why?” would you ask. She would reply
“Because, if the game is repeated many times, the cost of miscoordination
at one or even a few stages won’t matter too much compared to the chance
of getting 10 for the rest of the play. So it is very likely that one of them
will deviate from Momus’s prescription attempting to suggest a better way
of playing. And, of course, the other will realize it: after all, they are both
rational individuals, they know that the other one is rational too, if they
follow the prescription they will get very little. So, as soon as there is a
chance to move to a better regime, they will take advantage of it. I agree
that this may be a little more difficult in game 1.2 compared to game 1.1: the
outcome (A,B) is very bad for the one who plays A but may be acceptable
to the B player. Still, in a frequently repeated game, I am confident that
they would end up in (A,A). Actually it is not even necessary that they
play the same game at each meeting; as long as in every stage the game
has an obviously good outcome for both players, they will tend to agree on
playing it as soon as possible. I would think that, using actions as messages,
interpreting them as such and giving a coplayer the chance of expressing her
doubts on suboptimal behaviors is an innate attitude of all of us”.
The aim of this paper is to formalize and make rigorous this kind of
argument. This not only in order to convince your friend that game theory
has something to do with human behavior: the assumption that agents,
whenever possible, coordinate on a Pareto efficient equilibria is a widespread
one in economic theory3and it would be nice to have a theoretical foundation
of it.
Let’s begin with game 1.1 and repeat it N times, N large. What are the
sensible payoffs that you would expect? The folk’s theorem does not say too
much. For instance it is easy to see that even a low average payoff like 1
can be supported by a Nash and even a perfect equilibrium 4. Not only very
bad outcomes are supported, but, if we look at the equilibria constructed to
support them, we will be struck at how odd they are: you are supposed to
blindly punish every kind of deviation, even those that benefit you and the
punishment, in many games, may be more costly to you than to the one who
3This was, for instance, the assumption motivating [2] and much of the subsequent
work on renegotiation proof equilibria.
4See [18] for references and extensive discussions on the topic
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is deviating. (You have even to punish a coplayer for not punishing you!)5.
Punishing somebody suggesting a mutually advantageous equilibrium
does not seem to be a very successful attitude, especially from the evolu-
tionary point of view. So you may wonder what evolutionary stability can
say in these cases. At first sight the answer seems to be “as little as the folk
theorem”, in fact, it is easily seen that the strange (self) punishing equilibria
above are neutrally evolutionary stable. The weakness is not in evolution,
however, but in its modeling through neutral stability6.
The problem here is that neutral stability overlooks a basic fact: you
can punish deviations from the equilibrium path when they take a different
action because you see them, but you cannot punish people who just think
that they will not punish mutants7. More generally mutants deviating from
the population on contrafactual events will undetectable and can not be
selected away by any means. So there is no reason to believe that at some
point they will be driven out from the population. Actually they could as
well invade the population.
Neutral stability is blind to this phenomenon: indeed a population may
be vulnerable to attacks by these “silent” mutants even if its strategy satisfies
the formal requirement of NES. For this reason NES is usually very unin-
formative: in extensive form games, most components of equilibria contain
NES, no matter how bad they are 8.
A better model of “evolution” or “learning” etc. is to consider how behav-
ior changes under some adaptive process and identify the strategies, if any,
on which it eventually settles, the technical term for them are asymptotically
stable components of a dynamical system.
This is the approach of [7] where intrinsic conditions were found to insure
that a component is asymptotically stable for at least one consistent payoff
dynamic. As a consequence, ”‘intuitively bad”’ components can be selected
away as intrinsically evolutionary unstable. This result could, in principle,
5For experimental evidence that these are unnatural behaviors see [10] and the refer-
ences therein.
6This was already noted, in an analogous case, by Fudenberg and Maskin in [12], where
the difficulty was overcome assuming players are subject to involuntary mistakes during
all the game
7Actually many would argue that, without explicit communication, it doesn’t make
sense to say how you would react if your coplayer did something you expect with probability
zero. Not to say what you would do to a coplayer who just plans to do something different.
8A collection of paradoxical NES, with discussion of them will be available in [5]
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be applied to our repeated game; however checking the conditions involves
some elementary but nontrivial topological concepts and rather long proofs.
To make the work accessible to as many game theorists as possible, this
paper uses a more down to earth approach, based on the notion of ESSets,
introduced by Thomas. If a set of Nash equilibria is a ESSet not only no
mutant can do strictly better than the population but, if a mutant does
as well as the population, it has to be already in the set. In this way the
phenomenon of silent mutations described above is adequately dealt with.
Formal definitions are in section 3.
Section 4 exposes the results of the paper. The main one is that ESSets
consist of asymptotically efficient equilibria. Explicitly, when the game is
repeated many times, say N , the average payoff of strategies in ESSets must
converge to the one of the efficient outcomes in the stage game9.
In the following paragraphs we sketch how the proof, given in section 5,
proceeds. It illustrates what we think are some general principles of human
behavior and our arguments give an evolutionary foundation for them. 10.
We show that, if a strategy is inefficient, the population adopting it can be
invaded by mutants conforming to some simple behavioral maxims. Namely:
use actions at the beginning of the play as messages and interpret them as
such, do not punish those who communicate their willingness to deviate from
inefficient equilibria and avoid ”‘babbling”’.
Actions, particularly at the beginning of the game, can be used to send
messages; using and interpreting them in this way gives an evolutionary
advantage. In our proof we exploit this in two ways: first an action different
from those foreseen by the strategy can be used to signal that you are a
mutant, second it can be used to try to generate asymmetric outcomes. So
players can first agree that it is worthwhile to experiment better equilibria
than the one they are on, than they can use the previous history as an
anticoordination device, when anticoordination is needed. The first aspect
comes into play in subsection 5.1: A strategy in an ESSet must have at least
9Our attention, in this paper, is focused on games such as Stag Hunting where the
efficient outcome is a Pareto dominant equilibrium. For them the ideas at work can be
expressed in a relatively simple form. Some results are however obtained and stated more
generally and they will be used, in subsequent work on games of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and Hawk-Dove type. In these cases the necessary conditions for evolutionary stability are
the same but to find a concept that satisfies existence a more refined analysis is needed
10Some of these ideas where already in nuce in [16] and [9], in perspective they were
already present, in a different form, in the seminal paper [12].
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the same payoffs as one that is “nice to newcomers”. Explicitly, a population
will drift through silent mutations to one that has the same payoffs but,
instead of punishing deviations from the equilibrium path, it rewards them
by playing efficiently in the rest of the game. So a mutant could first deviate
and then trigger optimal cooperation. If the population is playing something
in an ESSet it must have a payoff at least as high as such a mutant.This
approach is in its essence similar to the ones pioneered by Fudenberg and
Maskin in [12].
But an inefficient strategy may try to defend itself by playing a babbling
equilibrium: i.e. it would play all actions with nonzero probability long
enough so as to make mutants unrecognizable or recognizable only when it is
too late. This is where the anticoordination property of asymmetric histories
becomes crucial. In section 5.2, “do not babble”, we show that strategy in
an ESSset can drift to less noisy ones. This is less easy as at a superficial
sight would seem, as the examples at the beginning of the subsection show
11.
Finally what should do if the strategy is “babbling” and the previous
history is symmetric? The answer is “nothing”: in section 5.3, “be patient”,
we show that such a case cannot repeat itself with too high probability, so
its contribution to the expected payoffs of strategies can be neglected.
In the end it is shown that all payoffs in an ESSet must be at least as high
as a strategy that devotes a certain number of stages c(N) to communication
only, getting the lowest possible payoff in the game, and then gets the Pareto
efficient payoff. This is our main result.
It is interesting to study c(N) more in detail. Not only does the ratio
c(N)/N go to zero, implying our asymptotic efficiency, but its order of mag-
nitude is rather small, i.e. N1/2. In an important special case it becomes
even smaller, just one, this is when the game is doubly symmetric, i.e. the
players have the same payoffs. There is a natural explanation of this fact:
if the players’ interests are totally aligned, it is necessary only one round
of the game to convey the message “this equilibrium is suboptimal, we can
do better from now on, let’s do it” and it is immediately understood. An
example shows that the condition of double symmetry is crucial, in games
11The problem is that, even if one begins with a game such a Stag Hunting, with Pareto
dominant evolutionary stable equilibria, in the repeated game some strategies can generate
strategic situations of the Hawk Dove game, with only one evolutionary stable symmetric
equilibrium, as explained in the example at the beginning of section 5.2, see also 5.3 in
the appendix
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where different payoffs generate a conflict between Pareto dominance and
risk dominance more rounds are needed...players do not trust each other at
first sight 12.
In this discussion we dealt with finitely repeated games. It is intuitive
that actual human beings should play infinitely repeated games with discount
close to one in a similar way to long finite games, even if many solutions
concept are not robust with respect to this analogy. The results of this paper
have this property and the mechanisms underlying the proofs are essentially
the same as shown in section 6.
Another feature of the function c(N) is that it is a universal function,
it depends only on N so in all games no more than c(N) stages are needed
to agree on playing efficiently, no matter how bad the priors on the other
player’s behavior are. Moreover, this this allows to make our result stronger,
as done in section 7. We allow the stage game to change from one step to the
other, provided that its payoffs stay bounded and there is always a unique
Pareto dominant equilibrium. The same results as for fixed stage games
holds.
This fact is, in my opinion, important because it answer a potentially fatal
objection to the evolutionary approach: ”Long repetitions of the same game
happen seldom in life so, how can the evolutionary force be strong enough to
generate an appreciable speed of evolution?”. The answer is that, even if the
same game with the same partner is seldom repeated, we are often matched to
partners, friends, colleagues with whom we play different games at different
times, and often they are all cooperation games, at least approximately.
According to our results, in these cases too evolution selects strategies that
do at least as well as those respecting some ”behavioral maxims”, like the
ones used in the proof. ”If you are locked in an inefficient social rule and
your partner, whose interests are aligned with yours, deviates from it, be
kind!: she may suggest the ”better way” you were yearning to”, ”Avoid
confusing actions, you must be able to recognize innovators”. They may be
philogenetically evolved rule of thumbs to optimize our interactions and this
can explain why we find them so ”natural” while equilibria violating them
look so ”artificial” or ”strange”.
The expression ”behavioral maxims” is an intentional reference to Grice’s
conversational maxims 13. In the same way as optimal cooperation in a
12See[1]for a discussion of the problem of ”‘trusting”’ in the one stage game
13See [14] and, for a textbook exposition, [17]
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conversation requires the use of certain conversational maxims, evolutionary
successful players in repeated games must respect similar behavioral maxims,
they are the rules for effective implicit communication. 14
An effort has be done to keep the exposition to a level accessible to most
game theorists. The proofs are often not straightforward and require some
willingness to carefully concentrate on details but the prerequisites do not
go beyond the definition of limit. The ones conceptually more relevant are
in the paper, the more technical ones in the Appendix. In order to keep
the size of this contribution within reasonable limits, calculus exercises and
straightforward checks are left to the reader.
2 The class of games
In this section we set the notation and we define the class of games we will
study: symmetric two players games that will be repeated a finite number of
times, denoted by N .
2.1 Stage Game
We begin with the stage game. Let G = (A, u) be a symmetric two-players
game, where A is the finite set of pure strategies available to each player,
and u : A2 → R is the payoff function: for a, b ∈ A, u(a, b) is the payoff to
a player who uses pure strategy a against pure strategy b. Let ∆(A) denote
the set of mixed strategies, that is, the unit simplex spanned by A, then u
extends to a function u : [∆(A)]2 → R in the usual way.
Note the difference with respect to an (asymmetric) two-players game
(A1,A2, u1, u2). In this case if player 1 plays a and player 2 plays b, the
payoff to player 1 is u1(a, b) and the payoff to player 2 is u2(a, b) (not u2(b, a)
!). So a symmetric game is a two-players game such that u1(x, y) = u2(y, x)
and this quantity is denoted by u(x, y). We also remind the reader that a
doubly symmetric game is a symmetric game in which the two players get the
same payoff, i.e. u(x, y) = u(y, x). From now on strategies in the symmetric
game will be called “Actions”.
14This is more than an analogy: in [6] it will be shown how at least a fragment of Grice’s
maxims can be translated in necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient communication
in repeated games
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Definition 2.1. Given a symmetric stage game G, let maxx∈A u(x, x) = P ,
maxx,y∈A
u(x,y)+u(y,x)
2
= R and min(x,y))∈A2 u(x, y) = Q, P will be called the
symmetric efficient payoff, R will be called the efficient payoff and Q will be
called the worst payoff.The difference D = P − Q will be called the worst
loss. We say that an action a such that a ∈ Argmaxx∈A u(x, x) is an optimal
action. An action pair (b, c) such that (b, c) ∈ Argmaxx,y∈A [u(x, y) + u(y, x)]
is an optimal action pair
There are two generic cases:
1. Either P = R, so there is a single action, the optimal one, realizing the
efficient payoff as in Stag Hunting,
2. or P < R, so the efficient payoff obtains in an antisymmetric outcome,
as in the Hawk-Dove game.
An important class of generic symmetric games is the one in which the
efficient payoff is not only symmetric but also a Nash equilibrium, it is the
object of the next definition.
Definition 2.2. We say that a symmetric game (G, u) is a Paretian Game
if the outcome of an optimal action (a, a) strictly Pareto dominates all the
asymmetric ones, i.e.
u(a, a) = max
(x,x)∈A
u(x, x) > max
(x,y)∈A
u(x, y)
Note that we do not require the optimal action to be unique, each optimal
action gives a symmetric strict Nash equilibrium (a, a). Examples of Paretian
Games are coordination games, e.g. stag hunting, but also more general ones
such as the one given below.


a b c d
a 10 0 3 1
b 9 10 0 8
c 9 8 2 9
d 9 8 7 4


Exercise 2.1. Find all Nash equilibria in the game, discuss their equilibrium
refinement and evolutionary properties.What would be a ”‘reasonable”’ way
of playing it, according to you?
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2.2 Finitely repeated games
Now we think of repeating N times the stage game G , we will denote the
repeated game by NG. The notation developed below is adapted from the
one in [18], some changes are principally due to the fact that time begins at
one and is finite.
Time: Let the set of time periods, t, be the {1....N}.
Perfect monitoring: Assume perfect monitoring in the sense that all ac-
tions in earlier periods are observed before the current period’s actions
are taken (simultaneously).
Histories: Let the set of histories in NG be
H = {ℵ} ∪
t=N−1⋃
t=1
Ht (2.1)
it is the union of a one element set, the zero history, h0 = ℵ, and the
Ht = (A
2)t for each t ≥ 1. For each period t, Ht is the set of all
possible action profiles that might have been taken up to t included:
[(a1, b1), (a2, b2), ..., (at, bt)]. A history is thus a finite string of action
pairs, across all earlier periods. Each such history uniquely defines a
subgame, and each subgame uniquely defines a history. Given a history
at time t , ht = [(a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . , (at, bt)], we define its mirror history
as h¯t = [(b1, a1), (b2, a2), . . . , (bt, at)], this is the history obtained by
reversing the role of the two players. If you have played the as and your
opponent has played the bs, you will see the ht above and your opponent
will see h¯t. If ht = h¯t we will say that ht is symmetric. We will sometime
have to use partial histories defined on segments of time, e.g. kt,s =
[(at, bt), . . . , (as, bs)]. Given a history ht = [(a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . , (at, bt)]
and a couple of actions (a, b) we define the composed history ht◦(a, b) ∈
Ht+1 as ht◦(a, b) = [(a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . , (at, bt), (a, b)], in the same way
given another history kt+1,s = [(at+1, bt+1), . . . , (as, bs)] we define ht ◦
kt+1,s = [(a1, b1), . . . , (at, bt), (at+1, bt+1), . . . , (as, bs)]. If gs = ht ◦ kt+1,s
for some kt+1,s,we will say that ht is an “ancestor” of gs and denote
this relation by ht ⊲ gs.
Strategies: A behavior strategy σ for a player is a mapping from histories
to randomized actions in G:
σ : H → ∆(A). (2.2)
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So, if, at time t, you see history ht, strategy σ is telling you to play
the randomized action σ(ht) and if your opponent is using strategy τ ,
she will be playing τ(h¯t) against you. Note that, if ht is an asymmetric
history, we will have in general τ(h¯t) 6= σ(ht), even if τ coincides with σ.
Given an action a ∈ A we will denote with σ(ht)(a) the probability that
a is played at t, conditional on ht. The space of behavior strategies will
be denoted by NB =
∏
h∈H ∆(A), a product of simplexes. Strategies
prescribing pure actions at each history will be called pure.
Plays: A play rt = [(a1, b1), . . . , (at, bt)] is an element of (A
2)t, it is what
has been played up to period t. For general information structures, it
is advisable to distinguish plays and histories, as done in [18]. When
perfect monitoring is assumed, as in this paper, they coincide.
Probabilities: Each behavior-strategy profile (σ, τ) recursively defines a
probability distribution over the plays, as follows. An application of
σ and τ to ℵ defines a probability distribution over the set of action
pairs in period 1. For each such realization, h1 = (a1, b1), an appli-
cation of σ and τ to h1 defines a probability distribution over the set
of actions in period 2, etc. The measure projects on partial plays.
Probabilities for histories are defined in the same way. Even when the
probability of a history is zero, probabilities can be conditioned on it
without ambiguity. The probability that play rt will be played by the
strategy profile (σ, τ), will be denoted by p(σ,τ)(rt). We will also need
the probability that the partial play rt+1,N = [(at+1, bt+1), . . . , (aN , bN)]
is played, conditional on on history ht being realized, it is written as
p
(σ,τ)
ht
(rt+1,N), note that it is well defined even if ht has zero probabil-
ity. When the two strategies coincide we will write pσ(ht) for p
(σ,σ)(ht).
Note that, by exchanging the two players, p(σ,τ)(ht) = p
(τ,σ)(h¯t) and so
pσ(ht) = p
σ(h¯t).
Payoffs: Given a play rt = [(a1, b1), ..., (at, bt)] its payoff is
U(rt) =
t∑
i=1
u(ai, bi) (2.3)
it is what a player playing the a’s earns against the one playing the b’s
from period 1 to period t inclusive. In a similar way we define U(ht)
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for a history. The payoff of strategy σ against strategy τ , denoted by
NU(σ, τ), will be :
NU(σ, τ) =
∑
rt
p(σ,τ)(rN)U(rt) (2.4)
We will also use the conditional payoff
NUht(σ, τ) =
∑
rt+1,N
p
(σ,τ)
ht
(rt+1,N)U(rt+1,N) (2.5)
where
U(rt+1,N) =
N∑
i=t+1
u(ai, bi) (2.6)
it is the payoff that σ expects against τ in the subgame defined by
history ht. We will simply write
NU(σ) and NUht(σ) for
NU(σ, σ) and
NUht(σ, σ) respectively.
In many of the proofs and in some examples we will use a family of
auxiliary games, called forward games, described in Appendix A, they will
be our main technical tool. The reader who wants to follow the proof in
detail should have now at least quick look at it.
3 Evolutionary stability concepts
Let now fix G, the stage game and NG the N repeated game. Remember
that NB =
∏
h∈H ∆(A) is the space of behavior strategies for
NG.
The original definition of Evolutionary Stable Strategy was given in [19]:
Definition 3.1. A strategy σ is evolutionary stable in a symmetric game
(G,A,U) if:
∀ τU(τ, σ) ≤ U(σ, σ) (3.1a)
U(τ, σ) = U(σ, σ)⇒ U(τ, τ) < U(σ, τ) (3.1b)
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this definition is very satisfactory for generic games but is, in general, not
satified if the game is not generic, as is the case of our repeated games. in or-
der to prove that something is something the strict inequality in 3.1b is often
weakened to a weak inequality, giving the so called neutrally evolutionary
strategies (NES). Being a neutrally evolutionary strategy is rather unifroma-
tive, as argued in the introduction: a collection of ”strange” equilibria that
are nevertheless NES is in [5] and available from the author.
A better approach to evolutionary stability is given by ESSets, as in-
troduced by Thomas in [20], its definition, adapted to behavior strategies,
is:
Definition 3.2. A non-empty and closed set X ⊂ NB is an evolutionarily
stable set (an ESSet) for NG if for each σ ∈ X there exists some δ > 0 such
that u(σ, σ′) ≥ u(σ′, σ′) for all σ′ in the best reply to σ within distance δ from
it, with strict inequality if σ′ /∈ X.
Intuitively when a mutant plays the best reply to the population and,
when in the environment it creates gets the same payoffs as population mem-
bers do, this mutant must be in the set. Next another definition:
Definition 3.3. We say that σ′ is an elementary mutation of σ at ht if σ
′
differ from σ only on the history ht, or its mirror h¯t, i.e σ(ks) = σ
′(ks) if
ks 6= ht, h¯t.
Elementary mutations do not require mutants to coordinate their changes
across periods and so are, in a sense, the simplest and likeliest to occur.
Proposition 3.1. Let σ ∈ X, X ESSet and let σ′ be an elementary mutation
of σ at ht, then:
NU(σ′, σ) ≤ NU(σ, σ) (3.2a)
if NU(σ′, σ) = NU(σ, σ) then NU(σ′, σ′) ≤ NU(σ, σ′) (3.2b)
if NU(σ′, σ) = NU(σ, σ) and NU(σ′, σ′) = NU(σ, σ′) then σ′ ∈ X (3.2c)
The proof, immediate and left to the reader, is the same as the well known
one for normal form games. 15
15Note that for more elaborate mutations it does not apply, due to the multilinearity of
the payoff function.
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This is the only property of ESS that we will use, so we will prove some-
thing stronger than our statement: our lower bound on payoffs will hold for
also for sets just immune to attacks on one point of the strategy at a time.
We make this fact explicit in the following
Definition 3.4. We say that a closed set X of behavior strategies is an ESSp
if for σ ∈ X, and σ′ an elementary mutation of σ at history at ht, we have:
NU(σ′, σ) ≤ NU(σ, σ) (3.3a)
if NU(σ′, σ) = NU(σ, σ) then NU(σ′, σ′) ≤ NU(σ, σ′) (3.3b)
if NU(σ′, σ′) = NU(σ, σ′) and NU(σ′, σ) = NU(σ, σ) then σ′ ∈ X (3.3c)
So, by proposition 3.1, every ESSet set is an ESSp. In this paper as-
sumptions will be always the minimal ones, i.e. that the set is an ESSp, and
conclusions will be the strongest ones, i.e. that the set is an ESSet. Note
that ESSets consist of Nash equilibria and ESSp sets induce Nash equilibria
in every forward game, this is exercise A.4 in the appendix 16.
It is not difficult to see that a singleton set X = {σ} is an ESSet if and
only if the strategy σ is an evolutionary stable one.
An important application of proposition 3.1 is to mutations that do
change the behavior of σ only on zero probability histories. The precise
definition is
Definition 3.5. Let σ be a strategy in NG, we say that σ′ is a silent mutation
of σ if
pσ(ht) 6= 0⇒ σ
′(ht) = σ(ht) (3.4)
The important property of silent mutation is stated in the next proposi-
tion
16There is a lot of leeway in the choice of definitions of evolutionary stability in extensive
form games. One can argue about populations and mutants coordinating their actions
across periods or not, express the conditions in mixed or behavioral strategies, discuss
their normal and agent normal forms etc. This would be an entertaining exercise, in the
spirit of [8]. As it goes outside the scope of this paper it will not be done here, that is why
we state results in their strongest form.
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Proposition 3.2. If σ′ is a silent mutation of σ then
∀ht, p
σ(ht) = p
σ′(ht) = p
(σ,σ′)(ht) = p
(σ′,σ)(ht) (3.5a)
NU(σ, σ) = NU(σ′, σ) = NU(σ, σ′) = NU(σ′, σ′) (3.5b)
σ ∈ X, X ESS ⇒ σ′ ∈ X (3.5c)
σ ∈ X, X ESSp⇒ σ′ ∈ X (3.5d)
The proof of equations (3.5a) and (3.5b) is obvious from the definition of
silent mutation. Implication (3.5c) follows from (3.5d) because every ESSet
is a ESSp. To prove (3.5d) we use induction: choose some ordering of the zero
probability histories and mutate σ step by step so as to obtain a sequence
σ0 = σ, σ1, ..., σn = σ
′ of silent mutations such that each σi+1 is an elementary
mutation of σi. The proof works because each elementary silent mutation
does not change the probability of histories. Then apply proposition 3.1 at
each step using equations (3.5a) and (3.5b).
Definition 3.6. We say that σ′ is a submutation of σ if
NU(σ′, σ) = NU(σ′, σ) (3.6a)
NU(σ′, σ′) = NU(σ′, σ′) (3.6b)
NU(σ′, σ′) ≤ NU(σ, σ) (3.6c)
Conditions (3.6a) and (3.6b) together imply that if σ ∈ X , an ESSp set,
then σ′ ∈ X, too.
A submutation is a dangerous and silly mutant: it can enter the pop-
ulation by making both the population and itself . . . worse. Still they will
prove useful to us because, if we can find a lower bound for the payoff of the
submutation, this will hold for the original strategy too.
Definition 3.7. Given a game G and the corresponding repeated game NG,
we say that π is an ESS payoff of NG if there exist an ESSet X for NG and
a σ ∈ X such that NU(σ) = π.
We say that π¯ is an average ESS payoff for NG if there is an ESSet X
for NG and a σ ∈ X such that NU(σ)/N = π¯.
Corresponding definitions hold for ESSp payoffs.
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4 Results for finitely repeated games
We can now state our results. The main technical one is proposition 4.1 that
shows that the average ESS payoffs for NG are asymptotically efficient, i.e.
they cannot be smaller than the symmetric efficient payoff in the limit of N
infinity. Actually we prove much more and we find a universal function c(N)
measuring the convergence rate for all games.
Moreover, if σ is a strategy in an ESSp set that uses only pure actions
the bound on the convergence rate is dramatically improved, it is just 1, and
the proof is particularly simple. We state the result separately in proposition
4.2.
A more intriguing drama betides when the game is doubly symmetric,
there too c(N) is one, as discussed in subsection 4.1.
Proposition 4.1 is then applied in theorem 1 to characterize ESS payoffs
in paretian games. Extensions and further applications will be discussed in
the conclusions.
Proposition 4.1. There is a universal function c(N) with limN→∞
c(N)
N1/2+ε
=
0 for all ε > 0, such that:
If G is a stage game with efficient symmetric payoff P and with worst
loss D and if Π(N) = inf
{
NU(σ)|σ ∈ X, X ESSet for NG
}
then:
ΠN ≥ P ·N − c(N) ·D (4.1)
in particular, the average ESS payoff will be approximately P or larger when
N goes to infinity. More precisely, if XN is a sequence of ESS for
NG and,for
every N , σN ∈ XN , we have:
lim inf
N→∞
NU(σN)
N
≥ P (4.2)
In case the strategy is a pure one we can say even more, and the proof is
much easier: as said c(N) turns out to be one:
Proposition 4.2. If X is an ESS for GN and if σ ∈ X uses only pure
actions :
NU(σ) ≥ N · P −D (4.3)
The function c(N) has an interesting interpretation: ESS payoffs are as
if, out of N rounds, c(N) of them where used exclusively to convey messages
between players then the optimal action is used.
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In this light it is clear that, if the strategy is a pure one, just one round of
communication should be needed:if the equilibrium is inefficient, the mutant
makes herself recognizable, players accept her implicit proposal and then play
efficiently.
If strategies are mixed something more interesting happens: the order of
magnitude of c(N), approximately N1/2, is the same as the order of mag-
nitude of the average standard deviation of statistics on actions. It is as if
the players where trying to understand if the deviations of their partner are
due to random fluctuations or are intentional attempts to convey a message.
This is, for the moment, only a suggestive interpretation: the a priori prob-
ability of a mutant in our model is zero so the mutant can be recognized only
after that other mutations have made the strategy drift to a non completely
mixed one and the mutant plays an action outside the support. We plan to
investigate the question in further work, where a continuous stream of non
zero probability mutants will be assumed.
Theorem 1. Let G be a Paretian game with optimal action a, optimal payoff
P and worse loss D and let its N repetition be NG. Then
1. The (possibly disconnected) set {σ ∈ NB|NU(σ) = N · P} consisting
of strategies playing always an optimal action against themselves is an
ESS.
2. If σ ∈ X, X an ESSp, then NU(σ) ≥ N · P − c(N) ·D
Here c(N) is the same function as in proposition 4.1.
Proof:The existence part is easy, if the game is paretian no action or cou-
ple of actions can get a higher payoff than P and P obtains only when an
optimal action is played against itself. So, if σ ∈ X and τ /∈ X one has
the strict inequality NU(τ, σ) < NU(σ, σ) and the result follows. Part two is
proposition 4.1
For existence of ESSets the strictness of the optimal action required in
definition 2.2is necessary as the following example, a borderline case between
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunting, shows:
( A B
A 10 5
B 10 7
)
(4.4)
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The reader can, as usual, prove it as an exercise. The theorem says that the
repeated game has at least an ESS and that all of them are approximately
efficient. Note that, even if the optimal action is unique, there are in general
other ESSets besides playing strictly optimally. For instance if G is generic,
a is the unique optimal action and (b, b), b 6= a is another strict Nash equilib-
rium, the set Xi = {σ|σ(ht) = a if t 6= i and p
σ(ht) > 0 while σ(hi) = b} of
strategies playing a on the equilibrium path at all times but at i is an ESS.
When the efficient payoff R is larger than P and so is given by a couple of
different actions, the results can be improved. In fact asymptotic efficiency
would consist first in trying to produce an asymmetric history, so that players
can be assigned roles, and then playing the asymmetric efficient equilibrium.
This is the object of next proposition.
Proposition 4.3. There is a universal function d(N) with limN→∞
d(N)
N1/2+ε
=
0 for all ε > 0, such that: if G is a stage game with efficient payoff R and
with worst loss D and if πN is an ESS payoff of
NG then:
πN ≥ R ·N − d(N) ·D (4.5)
The proof is an adaptation of the one of proposition 4.3. It will not be
given in the paper because the proposition, in itself, is of little use without
an existence result, as discussed in section 8
4.1 Doubly symmetric games and an instructive coun-
terexample
For doubly symmetric games, i.e. those in which each outcome gives the same
payoff to the two players, intuition suggests that the evolution towards op-
timal cooperation should be quicker, given that interests are totally aligned.
In fact the measure of communication inefficiency c(N) is 1.
Theorem 2. If the stage game G is a doubly symmetric one and if σ ∈ X,
X an ESSp for NG, then:
NU(σ) ≥ N · P −D (4.6)
For the proof, whose details are given in the Appendix, it is crucial that
the game is doubly symmetric. The following counterexample shows that it
cannot extended to just symmetric games and illustrates how games with
”risky” strategies require longer repetitions.
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Let the stage game be


a b c
a 10 1 1
b 9 0 3
c 9 3 0

 (4.7)
and repeat it two times.
Consider the strategy:
σ(ht)) =


1/3a+ 1/3b+ 1/3c if ht = h0 = ℵ
1/2b+ 1/2c if ht = (a, a), (b, b) or (c, c)
c if ht = (a, b), (a, c) or (b, c)
b if ht = (b, a), (c, a) or (c, b)
(4.8)
It is an isolated Nash equilibrium, and it is relatively inefficient and in
particular 2U(σ) = 6.5 < 2 · P −D = 2 · 10− 10 = 10. Nevertheless as a set
it is an ESSet, actually it is even a strictly evolutionary stable strategy. The
formal proof of these facts is in the appendix, here we just sketch the key
point, to illustrate the role of asymmetry in making it stable albeit relatively
inefficient.
Let’s consider how a mutant, τ , could drive the population out by devi-
ating in the first stage only (in the appendix it will be seen that changes in
stage two make the arguments even stronger). To the payoffs in stage one
we add the payoffs that would be obtained after the corresponding history
in stage two assuming the original strategy is respected (this is the forward
game, see appendix A for the formal definition.)


a b c
a 11.5 4 4
b 12 1.5 6
c 12 6 1.5

 (4.9)
Suppose that, a mutant τ is trying to improve on σ. It would be tempting
to raise the weight of playing a in the first stage. Indeed if τ(ℵ) = a and τ
coincides with σ in the stage two, we have 2U(τ, τ) = 11.5 > 6.5 = 2U(σ, σ).
Unfortunately 2U(σ, τ) = 11 + 5/6 is still greater, and so τ will not be able
to enter the population.
The conceptual reason for this is that, due to the lack of double symmetry,
a is a good but risky strategy: if you play a and the opponent doesn’t, she
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gets a hight payoff while you loose a lot, and since the population is playing
all actions with the same probability this will be likely to happen.
So a mutant naively deviating to a will not be able to drive the population
out, the benefit it gives to the population are higher than the benefit it gives
to itself. In fact the stage game contains a stag hunting game and the forward
game even a prisoner’s dilemma.
5 Proofs
In this section we prove of propositions 4.1 and 4.2.
We start from an arbitrary strategy σ in an ESSp, X. The set X will be
kept fixed through all the proof. We will first move σ inX via silent mutations
and submutations until we we will reach a new strategy σ′, particularly easy
to study. Than we will show that the payoff of this one is higher than
N ·P−c(N)D. Since silent mutations do not change NU(σ) and submutation
may only decrease it, any σ in X satisfies the lower bound, too.
The argument consists of three parts, each of them related to a different
aspect of evolution.
In subsections 5.1 we show that the strategy can evolve within X into
an open minded one, i.e. one that upon recognizing a mutant kindly plays
the optimal action. The process does not change its payoff. This is already
enough to show that, in X, strategies with non-full support at the early
stages of the game are efficient.
In subsection 5.2 we deal with strategies with full support. We concen-
trate on what happens after an asymmetric history. It is possible, without
leaving X of course, to exploit the history as an (anti)coordination device
and to assign roles to the players, so that they employ asymmetric actions
against each other. This reminds, in its simpler form, the passage from the
symmetric mixed strategy to the asymmetric pure strategies in the Hawk-
Dove game. There is, however, an important additional fact: our goal is not
to increase the payoffs but to reduce the support of the strategy and then
to apply the results of subsection 5.1. In fact, we want to avoid precisely
that when a mutant enters the population, both the population and the mu-
tant payoffs increase by the same amount. This is the object of a detailed
and technical analysis in the appendix, where we show that it is possible to
decrease the support using submutations only.
In subsection 5.3 we deal with the remaining case: strategies that have
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full support after symmetric histories. Since they have full support, there is a
nonzero probability that the players play different strategies and so generate
an asymmetric outcome to which the reasonings in subsection 5.2 can be
applied. We estimate this probability in terms of the payoffs and we show
that low payoffs imply high probability of generating symmetric outcomes.
A final argument, given in subsection 5.4, uses the optional sampling
theorem, the conditional payoffs are recognized as a supermartingale that,
stopped at an appropriately chosen time, satisfies the lower bound we want.
An elementary proof avoiding martingale theory is also sketched.
At the beginning of the first three subsections we discuss informally some
examples in order to introduce the concepts that will be used.
5.1 Be kind to newcomers
In this subsection the focus is on pure actions. Let’s see first in an example
how they lead to efficient play.
Consider the stage game
( C D
C 10 0
D 0 7
)
(5.1)
and suppose we repeat it N times with N at least 4. It should be obvious
that there are ESSets for the game, e.g. playing C all the time and getting
10N , the best possible payoff.
We claim that if X is an ESS set and σ a pure strategy in it, the payoff
of σ cannot depart too much from efficiency, in fact, σ must earn at least
10(N − 1) against itself. To see this, let σ′ be the strategy coinciding with
σ except that it is ”‘open minded”’, i.e. if it sees something outside the
equilibrium path -and so realizes that the coplayer is a mutant- it will play C
against it. It is clear that σ′ is a silent mutation of σ and so, by proposition
3.2, we have σ′ ∈ X, earning the same payoff as σ.
Let now τ be a mutant that in the first stage plays an action different
from the one played by σ′; this is possible because we assumed that σ, and
so σ′ plays pure actions. In all other stages τ plays C unconditionally. Let’s
see what happens to τ when it meets σ′. At t = 1, it earns 0, suffering the
worst possible loss in G. Still deviation was an insightful choice: now σ′ has
recognized it and, being open minded, is nice to it (and to itself...) by playing
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C; so, at 2, 3, . . . , N it earns again 10. Altogether this makes (N − 1)10. So,
if σ′ has to be a best reply to itself it must earn at least as much, and the
same holds for σ.
This simple mechanism is used by propositions 5.1 etc. below to prove
the general case and something more. It is enough, indeed, that one of the
σ(ht) has not full support in some early stage of the game for the conditional
payoff Uht to be high, the sooner this happens the higher the conditional
payoff will be.
Note that our result does not say anything about how the high payoff is
reached. In the up to 99 times repeated stage game:
( C D
C 10 0
D 0 9.9
)
(5.2)
the strategy playing, (D,D) all the time is in an ESSet. Of course, if G
besides being paretian is also generic, the optimal action a will be unique
and so, when N goes to infinity, the only way to achieve high payoffs will be
to play a often enough.
We now begin with the formal proof.
Let G be a symmetric game and with a, P and Q and D as in definition
2.1. First note that we can subtract Q from all the payoffs and divide the
result by D. This does not change the structure of Nash equilibria or ESSets,
of course, and rescales all payoffs in sight. So, without loss of generality, we
will assume in the proofs of this section that P = 1, Q = 0 and D = 1 17.
Explicitly:
Assumption 5.1. 1. G is a symmetric game, with P = 1, Q = 0 and so
D = 1.
2. The set X is an ESSp set for NG, the N times repeated game.
3. σ is a behavior strategy for NG and σ ∈ X.
We begin by formalizing the concept of ”open minded” mutation. A
mutant is open minded when her behavior on the equilibrium path does
not deviate from the one of the population but, when facing somebody who
deviates, tries to cooperate with her by playing a.
17In the examples we will continue to use larger integers, to avoid dealing with too many
fractions
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Definition 5.1. We say that σ′ is an open minded mutation of σ if σ′(h) =
σ(h), when pσ(h) > 0 and σ′(h) = a when pσ(h) = 0
It is obvious that open minded mutants are silent mutants, as we will use
often this fact we state it formally:
Proposition 5.1. Let X be an ESSp and let σ ∈ X, let σ′ be an open minded
mutation of σ, then σ′ is a silent mutation of σ and so, by proposition 3.2,
σ′ ∈ X and NU(σ) = NU(σ′).
In the following, whenever we will construct a new strategy in X, we will
use this proposition to assume that it is open minded.
If we want to escape from an inefficient equilibrium, apart from being kind
to newcomers, we should also be able to recognize them ans so we should
avoid noisy actions, as we defined here:
Definition 5.2. We say that a strategy σ is not babbling at history ht if
supp (σ(ht)) 6= A.
A history at which σ is not babbling will be called a not-babbling history
(for σ). Not-babbling, open minded strategies allow mutants to make them-
selves recognizable and coordinate optimally with them, so, if they belong to
an ESSp set, they must themselves have high payoffs as the next proposition
shows:
Proposition 5.2. Let σ ∈ X, X ESSp, and σ open minded, assume that it
does not babble at ht, then Uht(σ) ≥ N − t− 1.
Proof:Let x /∈ supp (σ(ht)) and let τ be the elementary mutation that plays
x on ht and coincides with the open minded σ otherwise. When playing
against σ and conditional on ht, τ plays x at step t+1, earning at least zero.
At this point σ will realize that τ is not another “sigma” and, being open
minded, will play a from next step, t+ 2 on, so that NUht(τ, σ) ≥ N − t− 1.
Since NUht(σ, σ) ≥
NUht(τ, σ) by the definition of ESSp set, the result follows.
Note that we do not need pσ(ht) 6= 0; if p
σ(ht) = 0, we have the stronger
inequality Uht(σ) ≥ N − t because of open mindedness.
By now we have already proved proposition 4.2: just apply proposition
5.2 to t = 0.
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5.2 Don’t babble
Now things become harder: the simple argument of the preceding section
fails if the strategy prescribes full support at the early stages of the game.
This makes mutants unrecognizable, and prevents them from being able to
drive populations out.
We give an example of how such a strategy may look like.
Consider the stage game, of the Stag Hunting type:
( C D
C 10 6
D 9 7
)
(5.3)
and repeat it two times. Let σ be defined as follows: in the first stage it plays
1/2C + 1/2D, in the second one it plays C on asymmetric histories (namely
(C,D) and (D,C)) and D on the symmetric ones ( (C,C) and (D,D)). This
strategy is an isolated Nash equilibrium and the singleton {σ} is an ESSet.
In fact if τ is a best reply to it, at time 2 strategy τ must coincide with σ,
because the unique best replies to C and D respectively are themselves. At
stage one the forward game, defined in appendix A, is
( C D
C 17 16
D 19 14
)
(5.4)
It is now of the Hawk-Dove type: if τ is doing anything different from
1/2C + 1/2D, it will earn against itself less than what σ does. So we have
NU(τ, τ) < NU(σ, τ), for all best replies τ to σ different from σ: we have no
choice but to live with our expected payoff of 16.5 18.
The strategy σ above is stoutly staunchly stubbornly stable: it is an
evolutionary stable strategy, it is an ESSet, it is an asymptotically stable
limit point for every sensible dynamics . . . yes, but only if we restrict ourselves
to symmetric strategies. If we allow asymmetric ones its index will become
−1 instead of 1 and the strategy will become evolutionary unstable, in every
sense you want, see [7]; the two stable, in every sense, outcomes will be (C,D)
and (D,C).
18In this simple example the payoff is not too bad compared to the optimal one of 20,
if you want to see a dramatic loss in payoffs take the more complicated game (4.7).
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And this is what can save us in longer games: if the game is just a segment
of a longer one and has been preceded by an asymmetric outcome we have a
chance. Suppose that an asymmetric history h, say playing (x, y), x 6= y has
been observed. A strategy restricting to the one as before on this subgame
cannot be in an ESSet not even in an ESSp as we show now.
Take a mutant τ that uses the history as an anticoordination device: if it
observes (x, y) it plays, say, C, if it sees (y, x) it plays D, elsewhere it agrees
with σ. Assume that the history has non zero probability pσ(h) = pσ(h¯) 6= 0.
The mutation τ is obviously elementary.
Now, τ is a best reply to σ because its actions are in the support of σ.
Moreover, upon meeting itself after either of the two asymmetric histories,
τ has better payoffs than the one σ against τ would get. This because it
anticoordinates with itself optimally while σ randomizes. In fact, if ht =
(x, y), we have, Uht(τ, τ) = 16 ≥ Uht(σ, τ) = 15, and Uh¯t(τ, τ) = 19 ≥
Uh¯t(σ, τ) = 18. Adding the two contributions, we get U(τ, τ) − U(σ, τ) =
p(h)[(16 + 19)− (15 + 18)] = p(h)[35− 33] > 0. So σ is not in an ESSet, nor
in a ESSp, any more.
There is another necessary ingredient in our proofs: suppose at some
point we hit a forward game such as
(C D
C 0 1
D 0 1
)
(5.5)
and that σ(h) is 1/2C + 1/2D, earning 1/2 against itself. ”‘Well, the case
seems to be easier than the preceding one, we take as our elementary mutation
τ(h) = C , and continue our proof with it . . . ”’ Wrong!: if we do so we get
indeed a new τ in the ESSp set X but we have raised its payoffs to one, so,
if we want a lower bound on ALL payoffs in the ESSp this τ is useless. The
right trick here is to remember that what we look for are strategies that,
at the beginning of the game, are better in sending messages, rather than
getting high payoffs. Actually we will choose, among the possible elementary
mutation of σ the one with lowest payoff and this is why we introduced the
concept of submutation, defined in 3.6.
Proposition 5.3. Let σ ∈ X, X ESS, let ht be an asymmetric history, then
there is an elementary submutation of σ at ht, σ
′, such that both σ′(ht) and
σ′(h¯t) are pure actions.
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In particular, the new strategy, σ′, will not babble, σ′ ∈ X and NU(σ′, σ′) ≤
NU(σ, σ). The proof, elementary but a little technical, is given in the Ap-
pendix.
Iterating this procedure we get:
Proposition 5.4. Given an X ESSp and a σ ∈ X there is a σ′ ∈ X such
that NU(σ′) ≤ NU(σ) and NUht(σ
′) ≥ N−t−1, if ht is an asymmetric story.
Proof:It is straightforward: we chose some ordering of the asymmetric his-
tories, starting from t = 1 on, so that longer histories come after the shorter
ones. Then we perform the submutations of prop 5.3 on non zero probability
couples of asymmetric histories, couple by couple in the chosen order.
At each step the strategy becomes a pure action one on a couple, payoffs
do not increase and the strategy on the rest of the histories does not change
19.
We repeat the process until we get a strategy that is not-babbling at all
nonzero probability asymmetric histories, is still in X and has payoffs not
higher than the original one. .
If needed, a sequence of silent mutations on zero probability histories, as
in subsection 5.1, makes the σ′ of the preceding proposition open minded,
too. All this without leaving X.
So, if we call σ again the new strategy we constructed, we can recapitulate
its properties:
Proposition 5.5. Given an X, ESSp for NG there is a σ ∈ X such that:
1. Conditional on zero probability histories, it would play the optimal strat-
egy, i.e if pσ(ht) = 0 then σ
′(ht) = a, and so
NUht(σ) ≥ N − t.
2. Conditional on no-babbling histories it earns the efficient symmetric
payoff up to one, i.e. if supp(σ′(ht)) 6= A then
NUht(σ) ≥ N − t− 1.
3. Conditional on asymmetric histories it earns the efficient symmetric
payoff up to one i.e. if ht 6= h¯t then
NUht(σ) ≥ N − t− 1.
4. For any other σ′ ∈ X, we have NU(σ′, σ′) ≥ NU(σ, σ).
19Choosing the ordering to be compatible with the length is not really necessary here,
it has the advantage that it makes the process faster, because all but one descendants of
an asymmetric history get probability zero. Moreover, in the case of infinitely repeated
games treated later, it is the natural thing to do.
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Points 1 to 3 have already been proved, point 4 follows by taking a strat-
egy in X with lowest payoff, this exists because X is compact, and then
performing the silent mutation and the submutation of this section on it.
Of course, in points 2 and 3, we do not know exactly what σ plays, we
just know what it earns.
5.3 Be patient
We have proved that, if σ is as in proposition 5.5, it will start getting the
symmetric efficient payoff as soon as a non-babbling or asymmetric history
obtains. To finish the proof we will proceed as illustrated in the example
given below. Namely if a strategy prescribes actions with full support at
every stage, the probability of an asymmetric outcome is non zero and, after
a certain number of stages, symmetric histories will have very low probability
and so their contribution to the expected payoff will be irrelevant compared
to the high paying asymmetric ones.
There is however a problem to be solved first. If the strategy prescribes
an almost pure action, i.e. one that gives probability almost one to a pure
action, an asymmetric outcome will be possible but unlikely. So if the mixed
actions become more and more pure when the game progresses, it will take
a long time before enough asymmetric histories appear and they won’t have
enough time to get a significant payoff.
This problem is dealt with in proposition 5.6, that shows that if the
conditional payoff of a history is low our σ must be enough mixing.
The next subsection 5.4 completes the proof along the lines of our ex-
ample. An appropriate k is guessed, it must be large enough to allow the
probability of symmetric histories to dwindle but not too large so that asym-
metric histories have the time to hoard high payoffs in the rest of the game.
A good choice is the square root of N , that gives our estimate on c(N). To
estimate the rate at which asymmetric histories before k are produced we
use proposition 5.6 together with the optional stopping theorem.
The role of the choice of k is illustrated in the following example Consider
the stage game
(C D
C 0 1
D 1 0
)
(5.6)
repeat it N times, N large. Let σ be the strategy that begins by playing
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1/2C+1/2D and continues to do so until an asymmetric outcome is realized,
at this point it repeats the last move.
Chose a t. The probability that the history, after t stages, is still sym-
metric is 1/2t. If at time t an asymmetric outcome is played, players can
anticoordinate and get 1 at each of the next stages, so altogether N − t. It
follows that the payoff of σ is at least (1− 1/2t)(N − t).
If we vary t we get NU(σ) ≥ max1≤t≤N(1−1/2
t)(N−t) so taking e.g. N =
1032 and t = 10 we get 10U(σ) ≥ 1021 + 1/512 , a rather good estimate.In
fact the mistake is less than 1 % given that the true value is little more than
1031 by the following exercise:
Exercise 5.1. Prove that if NG and σ are as above, NU(σ) = N − 1+ 1/2N
Hint: Show that the forward game NGσℵ is
( C D
C N−1U(σ, σ) N
D N N−1U(σ, σ)
)
(5.7)
and use recursion.
I cheated a little bit because I took the most favorable case: the mixed
actions here are always 1/2C + 1/2D, so the probability of a symmetric
history decreases very fast: it gets halved at each step and it is easily seen
that the optimal t is of the order of logN , in words, very few step are spent
in communicating and forging a correlation device to play efficiently.
In general life is not so easy: the mixed actions are not constant, so
a priori it might happen that the probability of generating an asymmetric
action goes to zero so fast that bad asymmetric histories survive for a long
time.
The goal of the next set of propositions is to prove that this is not the
case. The reason is intuitively simple. If a mixed action played independently
on both sides has a low probability of generating an asymmetric outcome, it
means that there is a pure action, say x that will be played with probability
almost one.
But if the payoff of the strategy is low and the strategy satisfies proposi-
tion 5.5 this is impossible: indeed, playing against the strategy a pure action
y, different from x,would generate an asymmetric history with high payoff,
so the original action would not be a Nash equilibrium in the forward game
and σ could not be in an ESSp set, by exercise A.4 in the appendix.
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This is what the next proposition formally states, recall that σ(ht)(x) is
the probability that, after history ht, σ takes action x.
Proposition 5.6. Let σ ∈ X, let pσ(ht) > 0, supp(σ(ht)) = A and ht
symmetric, let σ satisfy proposition 5.5.
If Uht(σ) ≤ N−A then ∀x ∈ A, σ(ht)(x) ≤ 1−
A−t−2
N−t−2
and the probability
that the outcome is asymmetric is at least A−t−2
N−t−2
.
Proof:Let x be given and let y 6= x be another action. Let us consider the
forward game Ght .
We have V σ1,ht(y, x) ≥ (N − t − 2) because after (x, y) the history will
be asymmetric and σ satisfies 5.5. So, given that payoffs are linear and
nonnegative, V σ1,ht(y, σ) ≥ (N − t− 2) · σ(ht)(x).
On the other side, action σ(ht) is a best reply to itself in the forward game
so V σ1,ht(y, σ(ht)) ≤ V
σ
1,ht
(σ(ht), σ(ht)) = Uht(σ(ht)) ≤ N −A, remember that
ht is symmetric.
Putting together the inequalities you get the bound on σ(ht)(x). The
lower bound on the probability of the outcome follows from the next lemma.
Lemma 5.1. If in a stage game every action is taken with probability at
most 1 − δ, 0 ≤ delta ≤ 1/2, the outcome is asymmetric with probability at
least δ.
Proof:If p1, p2, . . . , pn are the probabilities of actions a1, a2, . . . , an respec-
tively, the probability of an asymmetric outcome will be 1 −
∑
p2i . It is
a concave function and we look for its minimum on the convex set L =
{(p1, p2, . . . , pn)|0 ≤ pi ≤ 1− δ,
∑
pi = 1}.It is achieved on one of the ex-
treme points that , up to permutation of indexes, is (1 − δ, δ, 0, . . . , 0). The
value there is 2δ(1− δ) ≥ δ.
5.4 Completion of the proof
We prove now our bound on the inefficiency c(N) when N goes to infinity.
To do so we will concentrate on the first periods of the game, when the role
of action as message carriers is more pronounced.
Suppose a σ as in proposition 5.5 has been taken and is fixed in the rest
of the proof. We claim that σ has payoff at least N − c(N), with c(N) as
in proposition 4.1. Choose a small ε > 0 and let β = 1/2 + ε. We call a
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history “bad” if Uht(σ) < N−N
β, if not it will be called good. Of course the
distinction is useful only for t ≤ Nβ: after that time all histories are bad.
If t ≤ N1/2−1 and if ht is any asymmetric history we know, by assumption
5.5, that Uht(σ) ≥ N−N
1/2 . So for t up to N1/2−1 only symmetric histories
can be bad.
Note that, because of formula (A.20), a bad history can generate a good
one and a good history con generate a bad one. On the other side, once a
history has become asymmetric, all its descendants will be so.
Let us now fix k = N1/2− 1 and consider histories generated by (σ, σ) at
time k. A look at figure 1 may help the reader to follow the arguments.
We will partition histories in disjoint classes.
One class, named Ak, will contain all the asymmetric histories.
As for the symmetric ones, some of them can be good or can be bad but
have good ancestors. Given such a one, hk, we denote by g(hk) its oldest
good ancestor, this of course could be hk itself. We will call Sk the set of all
oldest ancestors: Sk contains some symmetric histories gt with t ≤ k. For
each gt ∈ S, we will denote by Dk(gt) the set of its symmetric descendants at
time k,it can contain both good or bad histories. TheDk(gt) form a collection
of disjoint sets, whose union will be called Bk.
Symmetric histories in the complement of Bk are bad and all their an-
cestors are, they will be called consistently bad. This set will be denoted by
Ck.
To resume, given a stage game G, an N , and a strategy satisfying as-
sumptions 5.1 and 5.5, the histories generated by it at time k are divided
in:
1. The set of asymmetric ones Ak
2. Sets of symmetric good ones or symmetric bad ones with a good an-
cestor, grouped according to the first good ancestor Dk(gt), gt ∈ Sk.
3. The set of consistently bad ones, Ck
To prove that NU(σ) is large for long games we show first that the bad
set Ck is small for N large. We denote by pN(Ck) the probability of event
Ck in a N times repetition of the game: it is a function of N and also of σ
and G.
In the next proposition we show not only that that it is small for N
large but also that the upper bound does not depend on σ or G, provided
assumption 5.1 is satisfied :
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9
Figure 1: A possible tree. Round circles are good symmetric histories, dia-
mond ones are bad symmetric, asymmetric ones are not shown. At time 3,
class B consists of histories 1,2,3,4,in the equivalence class D3(g1), 6 and 7
in D3(g2),and g3 in D3(g3). Class C contains the consistently bad histories
5, 8 and 9. So we have that NU(σ) ≥
∑
h3 asymmetric
NUh3 + p
σ(g1)
NUg1 +
pσ(g2)
NUg2 + p
σ(g3)
NUg3 + bad histories.
Lemma 5.2. Let NG and σ satisfy 5.1 and 5.5, and let ε and k be as above,
then pN(Ck) decreases exponentially when N goes to infinity, more precisely
there is a N¯ such that for N ≥ N¯ we have pN(Ck) ≤ exp(−N
ε/6). Moreover
N¯ = max(4, N1, 2
1/ε), where N1 is a universal constant, independent of ε.
Proof:By propositions 5.6 if ht is bad, it will generate an asymmetric history
at stage t+1 with probability at least N
β−t−2
N−t−2
, so the probability measure of
Ck will be bounded by
∏t=k−1
t=0
(
1− N
β−t−2
N−t−2
)
, with k = N1/2−1. The estimate
of this expression is a calculus exercise that can be found in the appendix.
We can now conclude the proof. The evaluation of NU(σ) is very quick
if we use the fact that Uht(σ) is a supermartingale.
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We define a stopping time θ as
θ = min (inf{t|ht is good}, k)
Se we have that either hθ is a good (symmetric or asymmetric) strategy
with Uhθ(σ) ≥ N − N
β or that θ = k and hk is consistently bad, the latter
case will happen with probability pN(Ck).
Now use (A.21):
NU(σ) ≥ E(NUhθ) ≥
(
1− pN(Ck)
)
(N −Nβ) +
∑
Ck
p(hk)
NUhk (5.8)
The sum over Ck contributes at least zero and so by our estimate of
pN(Ck), lemma 5.2,
NU(σ) ≥ (N −Nβ)(1− exp(−N ε/6) for N ≥ N¯ .
If you do not like supermartingales you can prove the same inequality
directly using the partition given above and equation (A.22). Again a look
at picture 1 may help.
So in the end we have
NU(σ) ≥ U(σ′) ≥ (N −Nβ)(1− exp(−N ε/6) > N −Nβ −Nexp(−N ε/6)
(5.9)
for N larger than the N¯ given above. More precisely, looking at the
expression for N¯ we see that inequality 5.9 holds if 1/2 > ε > log2
logN
and
N ≥ N1. We define:
c(N) =
{
inf1/2>ε> log2
logN
N1/2+ε +Nexp(−N ε/6) for N ≥ N1
N forN ≤ N1
(5.10)
Now we have NU(σ) ≥ N − c(N) and it is an easy exercise to see that
limN→∞
c(N)
N1/2+ε
= 0 for all ε.
This ends the proof.
6 Infinitely repeated games with discounting
In this section we deal with the case of infinitely repeated games with dis-
counting, we will use the notation for finite ones in section 2.2, apart from
the following changes:
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Time: The set of time periods will be now all the integers from 0 to ∞ :
{0, 1, 2, . . . }
Perfect monitoring: no change
Histories: Histories will now be:
H = {ℵ} ∪
∞⋃
t=0
Ht (6.1)
so the union of a one element set, now the −1 history, h−1 = ℵ, and
the Ht = (A
2)t+1 for each t ≥ 0. So Ht will now be the set of set of
[(a0, b0), (a1, b1), . . . , (at, bt)].
Strategies: no change. But now they form an infinite dimensional space,
so we will need to give a topology for them, this is done in subsection
6.2.
Plays: no change
Probabilities: no change.
Payoffs: The payoffs will now be discounted at rate ρ: so the payoff of
strategy σ against strategy τ , denoted by ρU(σ, τ), will be :
ρU(σ, τ) = (1− ρ)E(σ,τ)
(
+∞∑
t=0
ρtu(at, bt)
)
(6.2)
Multiplication by (1−ρ) makes the repeated-game payoffs easily compara-
ble with the stage-game payoffs. In particular, a player who earns constantly
the same stage-game payoff u in each period will have repeated-game payoff
u. The expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure induced
by the strategy profile (σ, τ).
The conditional payoff ρUht(σ, τ) is defined as
ρUht(σ, τ) = (1− ρ)E(σ,τ)|ht
(
+∞∑
s=t+1
ρsu(as, bs)
)
(6.3)
Note that we discount the value at time 0.
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The forward game is defined as before but now payoffs are
fV
(σ,τ)
1,ht
(x, y) = (1− ρ)ρtu(x, y) + NUht◦(x,y)(σ, τ) (6.4)
fV
(σ,τ)
2,ht
(x, y) = (1− ρ)ρtu(y, x) + NUh¯t◦(y,x)(τ, σ) (6.5)
We will be interested in the behavior of ρG when ρ is close to one. It
is well known that ρG can be interpreted as a game in which future payoffs
are undiscounted, but the probability that the game continues to the next
stage is ρ, in this case, the expected length of the game N¯ will be (1− ρ)−1,
or ρ =
(
1− 1/N¯
)
, this fact will be used to compare with the results for N
times repeated games.
6.1 Results
Proposition 6.1. There is a universal function f(ρ) that goes to 1 when ρ
goes to 1 such that: if G is a symmetric game with P and Q as before, ρG is
the corresponding discounted game and σ is a strategy in an ESSp set of ρG
:
ρU(σ) ≥ f(ρ)P + (1− f(ρ))Q (6.6)
In the proof it will be seen that we can take f(ρ) = ρ(−logρ)
−(1/2+ε)
, for
ρ close to one. It is trivial that this function goes to 1 when ρ goes to 1.
More interesting is to see how the estimate looks like when we write the
discount factor as ρ = (1 − 1/N¯), N¯ the expected number of rounds. Then
f(ρ) ≈ ρN¯
(1/2+ε)
. The interpretation should be clear: as in the case of finitely
repeated games a certain number of rounds, of order of magnitude N¯ (1/2+ε),
are needed to convey understand and implement the message: ”Let’s play
the optimal action instead of this nonsense”.
Theorem 3. Let G be a Paretian Game with optimal action a, optimal payoff
P and worse payoff Q and consider the infinitely repeated repeated game with
discount ρG. Then
1. The set {σ|ρU(σ) = N · P} = {σ|σ(ht) = a if p
σ(ht) > 0} consisting of
strategies playing always a against themselves is an ESS.
2. If σ ∈ X, X an ESS, then limρ→1
ρU(σ) = P
The proof is as in the finitely repeated case.
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6.2 Proofs
The proofs are similar or easier. We will just point to the few technicalities
involved and leave the rest to the reader as an exercise.
First we have to specify the choice of topology for for the infinite dimen-
sional space δB.
Strategies in δB are functions from the set of histories to the simplex of
mixed actions. We will give to it the standard product topology: given a
finite set of histories S and a δ > 0, a neighborhood of a strategy σ will be
the set of those strategies that, on histories in S, take mixed actions within
δ of the one taken by σ. In practice this means that a sequence of strategies
σi converges to σ if and only if, for each history ht, limi→∞σi(ht) = σ(ht),
not necessarily uniformly in ht.
The reader should check, it is a standard exercise, that the payoff function
(6.2) is continuous with this topology.
We can now use the definition of ESSet given in 3.2, note that the re-
quirement that X is closed is crucial, we had to give δB a topology because
of this.
Proposition 3.2 applies, not that now the mutation takes place at infinitely
many histories, so apart from induction, closedness is needed. The reader
can check it as a standard exercise.
Proposition 5.1 is the same. Again we need closure
Proposition 5.2 has bound ρUht ≥ ρ
t+2.
Proposition B.1 is the same.
Proposition 5.4 has bound ρUht ≥ ρ
t+2
Proposition 5.5 is the same, provided we change the values of the efficient
payoffs from N − t to ρt and so on.
Proposition 5.6 is now as follows.
Proposition 6.2. Let σ ∈ X, let p(ht) > 0, supp(σ(ht)) = A and ht
symmetric, let σ be as in proposition 5.5. If Uht(σ(ht)) ≤ ρ
α then ∀x ∈
A σ(ht)(x) ≤ ρ
α−t−3
Proof:Given x, let y 6= x the utility of playing y against σ(ht) in the forward
game is less than ρα, the utility of playing y against x is at least ρt+3 by
proposition 5.4. So we have σ(ht)(x)ρ
t+3 ≤ ρα and the result follows.
Now set α = (−logρ)−(1/2+ε) and β = integerpart(−logρ)−1/2. This
time bad symmetric histories will be those for which Uht(σ(ht)) ≤ ρ
α. It
is easily seen that, when ρ goes to one, α, β and α/β go to to ∞. In
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particular ρβ+3 > ρα when ρ is close enough to 1 and so histories that become
asymmetric before time β will be good.
The probability that ht+1 is bad and symmetric conditional on ht being
bad and symmetric is at most ρα−t−3 by proposition 6.2. So consistently bad
histories from t = 0 to t = integerpart(−logρ)−1/2 have probability at most∏t=beta−1
t=0 ρ
α−t−3 = ρβ
2 (α−3)
β
−1/2(1−1/β). By substitution of the values of α and
β it is easily seen that this goes to zero when ρ goes to one. So at time β
most histories are good and the result follows.
7 Behavioral Maxims
In this section we deal with a technically easy but, in the author’s opinion,
conceptually important extension of our results. Suppose that the game
changes at each stage and that it even depends on the previous history. Still,
we require that some gross features of it are preserved. All stage games must
be paretian, up to a permutation the optimal action may be assumed to be
a, the payoff of a against itself is at least P and the cost of miscoordination
is at most D. The optimal strategies may be complicated, involving a trade
off between current payments and histories leading to high paying games,
still the general principle holds: evolution leads to average payoff per stage
at least P .
More formally, given A and a ∈ A, P and D, let G(P,D) be the set of
all payoffs functions u : A2 → R such that
1. For all u ∈ G(P,Q) we have: a ∈ Argmaxx∈A u(x, x) and u(a, a) ≥ P
2. For all u ∈ G(P,Q) we have: P −minx,y∈A u(x, y) ≤ D
They define the class of symmetric games described informally above. Let
uh : H → G(P,D) be a function from histories to them. It defines a iterated
game NG˜ that has the same times, histories and strategies as that in section
2.2, and where the new payoffs are now defined as
N U˜(rN) =
N∑
i=1
uri(ai, bi) (7.1)
where ri is the first i segment of history rN .
The following theorem holds:
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Proposition 7.1. There is a universal function c(N) with limN→∞
c(N)
N1/2+ε
=
0 for all ε > 0, such that:
if NG˜, P and D are as above and if Π(N) = inf
{
NU(σ)|σ ∈ X, X ESSetforNG˜
}
then:
ΠN ≥ P ·N − c(N) ·D (7.2)
The proof is essentially the same as that of proposition 4.1. It can be
improved taking into account the above mentioned trade off between current
and future payoffs. Statement and proof are left to the reader.
8 Conclusions
It was proved that in long repeated games, the evolutionary stable payoffs are
asymptotically efficient. The results in this paper can be extended in several
directions. A similar one holds for asymmetric games and for multiplayers
games, we leave to the reader a formulation and proof of it.
More interesting is to see what happens in games such as the, finitely re-
peated, Hawk Dove or the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, in which new phenom-
ena occurs. Here too evolution leads from inefficient to efficient strategies
according to the same mechanism as the one described in this paper. The
problem is that it does not settle there and it should not because there are
no ESSets. If they existed, on one side they should be asymptotically effi-
cient, because of proposition 4.1, on the other one they would consist of Nash
equilibria, but the only equilibria in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
are inefficient 20.
We are not happy with just a negative result and intuition suggests what
a satisfactory extension should be. In these cases, it is not only enough to
be ”‘kind to foreigners”’ but, in order to survive, one should also be able to
”‘deter those who exploit my kindness”’.
In the setting of payoff consistent dynamics, mentioned in the introduc-
tion, this corresponds to an attractor that contains non Nash equilibria,
evolution approaches efficient strategies but then, to account of the possi-
bility of ”‘evil”’, and stupid, mutants, leads astray from it. It is interesting
to see what happens if a continuous stream of mutants is assumed, this is
20In the discounted case there are efficient components of NE, but they can be proved
directly to be vulnerable even to elementary mutations
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an idea that was already implicit in the original work of Maskin and Fuden-
berg [12]. The minimal asymptotically stable sets shrink to sets of strategies
that cooperate but, upon defection, are able to react switching to punish-
ment. The more sophisticated the entering mutants are assumed to be, say
experimenting a one time defection and then being open to cooperation, the
smaller the minimal asymptotically stable set will be allowing more and more
refined strategies see [3] for some analogous ideas. This will be the topic of
the following paper.
What are the new beh rules? intuition suggests something like ”Be kind
to newcomers, unless they cheat”’, ”‘Punish but to a moderate extent”’ etc.
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A Additional notation and tools
In this technical part we describe a basic tool for many of our proofs: the
forward game. We assume that N has been fixed and so, when no risk of
confusion arises, we will disregard it in our notation.
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Definition A.1. The forward game fG
(σ,τ)
ht
is a two player game (A,A, fV
(σ,τ)
1,ht
, fV
(σ,τ)
2,ht
)
in which the pure strategy set consist of the set of actions A for both players
and, given an action pair (x, y) ∈ A the payoffs are:
fV
(σ,τ)
1,ht
(x, y) = u(x, y) + NUht◦(x,y)(σ, τ) (A.1)
fV
(σ,τ)
2,ht
(x, y) = u(y, x) + NUh¯t◦(y,x)(τ, σ) (A.2)
Payoffs are extended to mixed actions in the usual way.
The interpretation of this game is the following: player 1 is a player that
has observed history ht and chooses action x , player 2, who has observed
history h¯t, choses y. To the payoffs of the stage game we then add what the
players would get if they used the relevant parts of strategies σ and τ applied
to histories ht ◦ (x, y) and h¯t ◦ (y, x) and to their descendants from time t+2
on.
We stress the fact that fG
(σ,τ)
ht
is a one stage game, the only choice is
(x, y), then the behavior is fixed by σ and τ .
We give below some properties of forward games to be used in our study
of mutations. First note that, if σ = τ and ht = h¯t, the game is symmetric.
In general we have fV
(σ,τ)
1,ht
(x, y) = fV
(τ,σ)
2,h¯t
(y, x).
Strategies pairs (σ, τ) in NG induce strategy pairs
(
σ(ht), τ(h¯t)
)
for player
1 and 2 in all games fG
(σ,τ)
ht
and we have:
NUht(σ, τ) =
fV
(σ,τ)
1,ht
(σ(ht), τ(h¯t)) (A.3)
and
NUht(τ, σ) =
fV
(σ,τ)
2,ht
(σ(ht), τ(h¯t)) (A.4)
In the proof of Theorem 2 in subsection 4.1 we will also need the contin-
uation game that we define below following [18]. In it, unlike the forward
game, every action after time t+ 1 may be chosen.
Definition A.2. The continuation game cUht is the N − t repeated game
N−tG beginning at time t + 1. A strategy σ in NG induces, by restriction
to descendants of ht, a continuation strategy denoted by
cσht:
cσht(kt+1,s) =
σ(ht ◦ kt+1,s).
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A.1 Some examples
This section is for reader who want to develop some familiarity with the
concept of forward game.
Consider the stage game
( H D
H −1 5
D 3 1
)
(A.5)
Repeat it two times. Let σ be defined as follows:
σ(ht) =


1/2H + 1/2D ifht = ℵ, (H,H)or(D,D)
H ifht = (H,D)
D ifht = (D,H)
(A.6)
In words: σ plays 1/2H+1/2D at time one and at time two after a symmetric
history. If the outcome is asymmetrical, players play again what they have
just played.
The game fGσℵ is symmetric and given by
( H D
H −1 + 2 5 + 5
D 3 + 3 1 + 2
)
(A.7)
The two added to the diagonal is the payoff of the mixed strategy.
Let now the game be repeated three times and let σ be similarly defined:
it begins by playing 1/2H+1/2D and repeats it until an asymmetric history
appears, upon an asymmetric history it repeats the last action until the end.
σ(ht) =


1/2H + 1/2D ifht = ℵ, (H,H), (D,D), [(H,H), (H,H)] ,
[(H,H), (D,D)] , [(D,D), (D,D)] ,
[(H,H), (D,D)] or [(D,D), (H,H)] .
H ifht = (H,D), [(H,D), (∗, •)] or [(•, •), (H,D))]
D ifht = (D,H), [(D,H), (∗, •)] or [(•, •), (D,H))]
(A.8)
Here (•, •) denotes any symmetric pair of actions and (∗, •) denotes any
arbitrary pair.
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Then fGσ(H,D) is the asymmetric game
( H D
H (−1 + 5,−1 + 3) (5 + 5, 3 + 3)
D (3 + 5, 5 + 3) (1 + 5, 1 + 3)
)
player one adds to the payoffs of period two the 5 she will get in period 3 by
playing H against D, player two adds 3, the payoff of D against H.
The next example shows how the structure of the game can vary during
the play.Let us start with the Stag Hunting game
(H D
H 5 2
D 4 3
)
(A.9)
Let the game be repeated two times and let σ be:
σ(ht) =


1/2H + 1/2D ifht = ℵ
H if ht = (H,D), (D,H)
D if ht = (H,H), (D,D)
(A.10)
The game fGσℵ is given by
(H D
H 8 7
D 9 6
)
(A.11)
note that it has become of the Hawk Dove type. In particular, the only
symmetric evolutionary stable strategy is the totally mixed one.
A.2 Easy Exercises and Fruitful Facts on the Forward
Game
Given α and β mixed actions in ∆(A), and a asymmetric history ht, we
define:
NW
(σ)
ht
(α, β) =
= fV σ1,ht(α, β) +
fV σ1,h¯t(β, α)−
fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), β)−
fV σ1,h¯t(σ(h¯t), α)
= fV σ1,ht(α, β) +
fV σ2,ht(α, β)−
fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), β)−
fV σ2,ht(α, σ(h¯t))
(A.12)
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It is a bilinear form in α, β. The V and the W functions will turn out to
be useful in the study of mutants payoffs, as the following propositions show.
The proofs are straightforward checks of the definitions and are left to the
reader, some informal hints are after the statements.
Exercise A.1. Let σ′ differ from σ only at history ht, and let σ
′(ht) = α
then
NU(σ′, σ)− NU(σ, σ) =
= pσ(ht)[
fV σ1,ht(α, σ(h¯t))−
fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), σ(h¯t))]
(A.13)
moreover, when ht is asymmetric i.e. ht 6= h¯t, we have:
NU(σ′, σ′)− NU(σ, σ′) =
= pσ(ht)[
fV σ1,ht(α, σ(h¯t)) +
fV σ1,h¯t(σ(h¯t), α)+
−fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), σ(h¯t))−
fV σ1,h¯t(σ(h¯t), α)] =
= pσ(ht)[
fV σ1,ht(α, σ(h¯t))−
fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), σ(h¯t))] =
= pσ(ht)[
fV σ1,ht(α, σ(h¯t))−
fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), σ(h¯t))]
(A.14)
and when ht is symmetric i.e. ht = h¯t we have:
NU(σ′, σ′)− NU(σ, σ′) =
= pσ(ht)[
fV σ1,ht(α, α)−
fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), α)]
(A.15)
Note first that pσ(ht) = p
(σ′,σ)(ht), because at histories before t, σ and
σ′ coincide. Moreover fV
(σ′,σ)
1,ht
= fV
(σ,σ)
1,ht
= fV
(σ′,σ′)
1,ht
because at histories after
t+ 1, σ and σ′ coincide, too. The only difference is at time t in how fG
(σ,σ)
ht
is played. Also remember that pσ(ht) = p
σ(h¯t).
Now the hints: equation (A.13) is proved by remarking that the strategy
profiles (σ′, σ) and (σ, σ) generate the same histories with the same proba-
bilities on the part of the game tree not following ht. So, if you are mutant
σ′ and you play against the population member σ, the only changes with
respect to to a σ playing against another σ will occur after you observe ht
(and so your opponent observes h¯t). This occurs with probability p
σ(ht). In
the following periods they revert to the prescriptions of strategy σ.
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Equations (A.14) and (A.15) are proved similarly. Note that after simpli-
fication expression (A.14) reduces to (A.13): in fact when the mutants meet
each other, the one who sees h¯t plays as the population does. In particular
these two expressions are both zero when α is a best reply to the population
strategy σ(h¯t).
Exercise A.2. Let ht be asymmetric and let σ
′ differ from σ only at histories
ht and h¯t, and let σ
′(ht) = α and σ
′(h¯t) = β then
NU(σ′, σ)− NU(σ, σ) =
= pσ(ht)[
fV σ1,ht(α, σ(h¯t)) +
fV σ
1,h¯t
(β, σ(ht))+
−fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), σ(h¯t))−
fV σ
1,h¯t
(σ(h¯t), σ(ht))]
= pσ(ht)[
fV σ1,ht(α, σ(h¯t)) +
fV σ2,ht(σ(ht), β)+
−fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), σ(h¯t))−
fV σ2,ht(σ(ht), σ(h¯t))]
(A.16)
and
NU(σ′, σ′)− NU(σ, σ′) =
= pσ(ht)[
fV σ1,ht(α, β) +
fV σ
1,h¯t
(β, α)+
−fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), β)−
fV σ
1,h¯t
(σ(h¯t), α)] =
= pσ(ht)[
fV σ1,ht(α, β) +
fV σ2,ht(α, β)+
−fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), β)−
fV σ2,ht(α, σ(h¯t))] =
= pσ(ht)
NW
(σ)
ht
(α, β)
(A.17)
Note that, when α = σ(ht) or β = σ(h¯t), expressions (A.16) and (A.17)
coincide with (A.13) and (A.14) respectively, that in their turn, coincide with
each other. The following exercise follows immediately from the definitions.
Exercise A.3. Let t be any fixed time, then
NU(σ, τ) =
∑
ht
p(σ,τ)(ht)[U(ht) +
NUht(σ, τ)] (A.18)
and
NUht(σ, τ) = u(σ(ht), τ(h¯t)) +
∑
kt+1|ht⊲kt+1
p
(σ,τ)
ht
(kt+1)
NUkt+1(σ, τ) (A.19)
The forward game is very handy in studying elementary mutations and
ESSp sets, as the following exercise shows.
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Exercise A.4. If (σ) belongs to a ESSP than for every ht such that p
(σ)(ht) 6=
0, (σ(ht), σ(h¯t)) is a Nash equilibrium of
fG
(σ)
ht
.
This is all we will need. The reader can, however, do the following two
instructive exercises:
Exercise A.5. If (σ, τ) is a Nash equilibrium of NG then, for every ht such
that p(σ,τ)(ht) 6= 0, (σ(ht), τ(h¯t)) is a Nash equilibrium of
fG
(σ,τ)
ht
. Find a
counterexample to show that the converse does no hold.
In fact, strategies inducing Nash equilibria in all fG
(σ,τ)
ht
correspond just
to Nash equilibria in the agent normal form of the repeated game. To get an
“iff”, we need subgame perfection:
Exercise A.6. The profile (σ, τ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only
if, for every ht, (σ(ht), τ(ht)) is a Nash equilibrium of
fG
(σ,τ)
ht
.
The if part is an easy backward induction argument, the only if is obvious.
Now suppose that G, the stage game, has all its payoffs ≥ 0. In this case
equation (A.19) gives:
NUht(σ, τ) ≥
∑
kt+1|ht⊲kt+1
p
(σ,τ)
ht
(kt+1)
NUkt+1(σ, τ) = E(
NUkt+1(σ, τ)|ht)
(A.20)
the weak inequality comes from the fact that,given our assumption on the
stage game, the L.H.S. does not contain the weakly positive payments at time
t + 1. In technical terms this means that the stochastic process NUht(σ, τ)
is a supermartingale. See [11], [15], [21] for references in increasing level of
sophistication. The optional stopping time theorem see [11], says that if θ is
a stopping time then
NUht(σ, τ) ≥ E(
NUkθ(σ, τ)|ht) (A.21)
Readers that are not familiar with supermartingales can use the following
fact that is actually a slight strengthening of (A.21).
Exercise A.7. Let S be a set of histories such that, for all ks ∈ S, ht ⊲ ks
21 and, if ks, js′ ∈ S, then ks ⊲ js′ → ks = js′. (In other words no history
21this of course implies s ≥ t
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in S is a descendant of another one in S: they are all “sisters”, “aunts” or
“cousins” with disjoint descendants.) The following inequality holds:
NUht(σ, τ) ≥
∑
ks∈S
NUks(σ, τ) (A.22)
Apart from disregarding the periods from t to s, the weak inequality here
is originated by disregarding also payoffs coming from some of descendants
of ht not in S.
B Proofs
Proof of proposition 5.3: We break the proof into two propositions, one
shows that are at least one action in σ(ht) and one in σ(h¯t) such that we can
increase or decrease their weights without leaving X, the second one uses
this fact repeatedly to reduce support and payoffs of σ.
Proposition B.1. Let σ ∈ X, X ESSp, let ht be an asymmetric history and
let supp(σ(ht)) = B, supp(σ(h¯t)) = C.
Case 1: If B has at least two elements and C is the singleton c there is
a pure actions b ∈ B such that if v− = −
σ(ht)(b)
1−σ(ht)(b)
< 0 and if the
elementary mutation σv is defined for all v− ≤ v ≤ 1 as:
σv(ks) =
{
vb+ (1− v)σ(ht) if ks = ht
σ(ks) if ks 6= ht, h¯t
then all the σv are in X. A similar statement holds if B is a singleton
and C is not.
Case 2: Let both B and C contain at least two elements. There are two
pure actions b ∈ B and c ∈ C such that if v− = −
σ(ht)(b)
1−σ(ht)(b)
and w− =
− σ(h¯t)(c)
1−σ(h¯t)(c)
and if the elementary mutation σv,w is defined for all v− ≤
v ≤ 1 and w− ≤ w ≤ 1 as:
σv,w(ks) =


vb+ (1− v)σ(ht) if ks = ht
wc+ (1− w)σ(h¯t) if ks = h¯t
σ(ks) if ks 6= ht, h¯t
then all the σv,w are in X.
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Note that in either case, the weights of b and c can decrease or increase;
the limits on v, w are taken so that σv and σv,w assign nonnegative weights on
all actions and so are always strategies. At the limits the support becomes
strictly smaller.
Proof:First of all, note that, if pσ(ht) = 0 all the σv and σv,w are silent
mutations and so are inX by proposition 3.2. So we can assume that pσ(ht) 6=
0.
Proof of case 1.
This is easy. Since σ is a Nash equilibrium of NG,
(
σ(ht), σ(h¯t)
)
is a Nash
equilibrium in the forward game fGσht by exercise A.4. So any b ∈ B =
supp(σ(ht)) is a best reply to σ(h¯t) and so:
NU(σv, σ)−
NU(σ, σ) = pσ(ht)[
fV σ1,ht(vb+(1−v)σ(ht), σ(h¯t))−
fV σ1,ht(σ(ht), σ(h¯t))] ≡ 0
(B.1)
by (A.13).
By formula (A.14) the same expression gives NU(σv, σv)−
NU(σ, σv) and
so all σv are in X.
Proof of case 2.
Let us choose
(b, c) ∈ Argmax
(x,y),x∈B,y∈C
NWht(σ)(x, y) ⊆ Argmax
(β,γ),β∈∆(B),γ∈∆(C)
NWht(β, γ) (B.2)
Since NW is a bilinear function and we are allowed to move β and γ inde-
pendently of each other, the inclusion of Argmax holds, namely the maximum
of NWht(β, γ) is achieved on pure actions. This is the point where we need
asymmetry: if ht where symmetric, we would need to set β = γ in order get
a well defined behavior strategy and the function NW , now being quadratic,
could have interior, totally mixed, maxima: it is the problem with the Hawk-
Dove type of forward game that we saw in the example.
We use the pure actions b, c to construct the σv,w in the statement of the
proposition.
It is obvious that σ is an elementary mutation.
As in case 1, since σ is a Nash equilibrium of NG,
(
σ(ht), σ(h¯t)
)
is a Nash
equilibrium in the forward game fGσht by exercise A.4.
We have b ∈ B = supp(σ(ht)) and c ∈ C = supp( ¯σ(ht)), so b is a
best reply to σ(h¯t) and c is a best reply to (σ(ht)). So
fV σ1,ht(b, σ
¯(ht)) =
fV σ1,ht(σ, σ
¯(ht)) and
fV σ2,ht(σ(ht), c) =
fV σ2,ht(σ, σ
¯(ht)) which implies that
NU(σv,w, σ) =
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NU(σ, σ) by formula (A.16), and so σv,w is a best reply for all allowed values
of v and w.
We now check what happens upon meeting the mutants. We have:
NU(σv,w, σv,w) −
NU(σ, σv,w) = p
σ(ht)
NW
(σ)
ht
(vb + (1 − v)σ(ht), wc + (1 −
w)σ(h¯t)), by formula (A.17). We call this function f(v, w) and we shall
prove that it is identically zero.
We prove first that f(0, w) = f(v, 0) ≡ 0. If w = 0 our mutant coincide
with σ at h¯t and so by the remark after Exercise A.2 the expression for
f(v, 0) coincides with (B.1) and is zero for the same reason.The same holds
for v = 0.
This implies that
(
∂f(v,w)
∂v
)
|v=w=0
=
(
∂f(v,w)
∂u
)
|v=w=0
=
(
∂2f(v,w)
∂2v
)
|v=w=0
=(
∂2f(v,w)
∂2u
)
|v=w=0
= 0.
Now we prove that the mixed derivative
(
∂2f(v,w)
∂u∂v
)
|v=w=0
is equal to 0.
We observe that on one side we have f(1, 1) = pσ(ht)
NW
(σ)
ht
(b, c) ≥ 0, be-
cause (b, c) is maximizing in equation (B.2). On the other side f(1, 1) =
NU(σ1,1, σ1,1) −
NU(σ, σ1,1) ≤ 0 because σ is in an ESSp set and σ1,1 is a
best reply.It follows that f(1, 1) = 0. Together with the vanishing of the
other derivatives this suffices to show that f is identically zero, if you are not
convinced read the next paragraph.
The function f(z, z) for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 is a quadratic function of one vari-
able that vanish with its first derivative at zero and vanish at one, the only
possibility is that it is identically zero. This implies that
(
∂2f(v,w)
∂u∂v
)
|v=w=0
=
1/2 d
2
dz2
f(z, z)z=0 = 0. So the function f(v, w) =
NU(σv,w, σv,w)−
NU(σ, σv,w)
is identically zero, because it is at most quadratic and all its first and second
derivatives vanish.
And so NU(σv,w, σ) =
NU(σ, σ) and NU(σv,w, σv,w) =
NU(σ, σv,w). But
this means that σv,w is in X for all v and w in its range of definition.
The next proposition uses the concept of submutation
Proposition B.2. Let σ be as in the previous proposition, then there is an
elementary submutation σ′ of σ in X that uses pure actions at ht and h¯t.
Proof:Suppose first that both B and C are larger than a one point set.
We will first show that we can take for σ′ one of the σ1,1, σ1,w− , σv−,1 and
σv−,w− defined in the previous proposition so that it is a submutation.
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Let us consider the linear function g(v, w) = NU(σ, σv,w) −
NU(σ, σ),
defined on the rectangle v− ≤ v ≤ 1 and w− ≤ w ≤ 1. This function is zero
on (0, 0), that lies in the interior of the rectangle, so it is either identically
zero or, if it is positive on some vertex, it must be negative on some other(s).
Choose for σ′ a nonpositive one. We now have NU(σ, σ′) ≤ NU(σ, σ), but, by
the preceding proposition NU(σ′, σ′) = NU(σ, σ′) so NU(σ′, σ′) ≤ NU(σ, σ)
and σ′ is a submutation.
As for the support: when each of these four strategies is applied to ht and
h¯t it has support strictly smaller than B and C respectively:they are either
the action b or c or their complements.
If one of the supports is one point you have a segment instead of a rect-
angle and the proof is the same.
At this point, if σ′ does not use already pure actions, we apply repeatedly
the previous proposition and the argument above reducing the support by
one at each stage until we get the result.
This ends the proof of proposition 5.3.
Proof of lemma 5.2: We want to estimate
t=k−1∏
t=0
(
1−
Nβ − t− 2
N − t− 2
)
with k = N1/2 − 1 and β = 1/2 + ε. Some easy algebra shows that
Nβ−t−2
N−t−2
≥ N
β−N1/2
N−N1/2
. So, at each of the k steps up to k, the measure of the set
of consistently bad histories will decay at least by the factor (1− N
β−N1/2
N−N1/2
) =
(1− 1−N
−ε
N1/2−ε−N−ε
) ≤ (1− 1
2N1/2−ε
). Where the last inequality holds for N ≥ 21/ε.
So the probability of Ck will be at most
(1−
1
2N1/2−ε
)k = [(1−
1
2N1/2−ε
)N
1/2−ε
]
N1/2−1
N1/2−ε
The expression in square brackets converges to e−1/2 uniformly in ε and
so is smaller than e−1/3 for N larger than some N1, independent of ε. For
N ≥ 4 the exponent N
1/2−1
N1/2−ε
is larger than N ε/2, so if N¯ = max(N1, 4, 2
1/ε),
the whole expression is less than exp(−N ε/6).
Proof of theorem 2:
First a trivial remark: if the stage game is doubly symmetric every out-
come in it gives equal payoffs to both players. So players have equal payoffs
in the repeated game, the forward games and the continuation games. (See
A.1 and A.2 for the definitions)
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Moreover, if the history ht is symmetric, the forward game
fGσht is sym-
metric, and so it is doubly symmetric, i.e. for ht symmetric we have
fV1,ht(x, y) =
fV2,ht(x, y) =
fV1,ht(y, x) =
fV2,ht(x, y).
If ht is asymmetric,
fGσht is simply a two player game giving equal payoffs
to the two players, i.e fV1,ht(x, y) =
fV2,ht(x, y).
As before, we assume without loss of generality that P = 1, Q = 0 and
so D = 1. We let a be an optimal action, so that u(a, a) = 1.
We will proceed by induction, for N = 1 there is nothing to prove. Sup-
pose the result is true for games repeated N − 1 times. Let X be an ESSp
for NG, let σ ∈ X. We look at what happens at the zero history.
If supp(σ)(ℵ) 6= A we are done by proposition 5.2 with t = 0: NUℵ(σ) ≥
N − 1.
If supp(σ)(ℵ) = A, we prove first an easy lemma.
Lemma B.1. Let X is an ESSp set for NG, σ ∈ X and pσ(ht) 6= 0, then the
continuation strategy cσht is in an ESSp set,
cX, for cGht.
Let cX be the set of restrictions to cGht of strategies that agree with
σ except after ht and that are in X. All elementary mutations of these
restrictions in cGht are also elementary mutation of the original strategies in
X and, when playing with elements of cX or among themselves induce the
same changes of payoffs, up to the nonzero factor pσ(ht) 6= 0.
Now because of full support, (a, a) is a symmetric history with non zero
probability, and so, by the lemma, σ restricts to a strategy in an ESSp
set in the N − 1 stages continuation game. This implies, by the induction
hypothesis, that NU(a,a)(σ) ≥ N − 2.
Since u(a, a) = 1 by hypothesis, we have that, in the forward game at
stage zero, fGℵ:
fV σ1,ℵ(a, a) = u(a, a) +
NU(a,a)(σ) ≥ N − 1 (B.3)
Let now τ be the elementary mutation playing a with probability 1 at
time zero and coinciding with of σ elsewhere. So τ(ℵ) = a, while σ(ℵ) will
be a full support mixed action, denoted by ξ.
Our result follows from the following sequence of equations:
U(σ, σ) = fV σ1,ℵ(ξ, ξ) =
fV σ1,ℵ(a, ξ) (B.4a)
fV σ1,ℵ(a, ξ) =
fV σ1,ℵ(ξ, a) (B.4b)
fV σ1,ℵ(ξ, a) ≥
fV σ1,ℵ(a, a) (B.4c)
fV σ1,ℵ(τ, τ) ≥ N − 1 (B.4d)
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Equation (B.4a) holds because σ(ℵ) is a Nash equilibrium with full sup-
port and so a is a best reply to it.
Equation (B.4b) because the game is a doubly symmetric one.
Equation (B.4c) because of the definition of ESSp.
Equation (B.4d) has been proved from the induction hypothesis in the para-
graph above.
Proof for example on page 18: We check definition 3.2. Let τ be a
strategy in the neighborhood of σ. If τ is to be a best reply to σ, its support
must satisfy
supp (τ(ht)) =


{a, b, c} if ht = h0 = ℵ
{b, c} if ht = (a, a), (b, b) or (c, c)
c if ht = (a, b), (a, c) or (b, c)
b if ht = (b, a), (c, a) or (c, b)
(B.5)
so τ(h1) = σ(h1) if h1 is asymmetric. If h1 is symmetric it is easily seen that
u (σ(h1), τ(h1)) = 1.5 and u (τ(h1), τ(h1)) = 1.5− λ(τ), where λ(τ) ≥ 0 and
strict inequality holds if τ 6= σ. It follows that the payoffs of the forward
game at stage one are:
V σ,τ1,ℵ = V
σ,σ
1,ℵ (B.6a)
V τ,τ1,ℵ = V
σ,σ
1,ℵ − λ(τ)I (B.6b)
where V σ,σ1,ℵ is the game (4.7) and I denotes the payoffs of the game


a b c
a 1 0 0
b 0 1 0
c 0 0 1


If we call V the matrix of the V σ,σ1,ℵ , and σ1 and τ1 the vectors of mixed
actions taken at stage one by σ and τ respectively, we have that
2U(τ, τ)− 2U(σ, σ) = (τ1 − σ1, V (τ1 − σ1))− λ(τ) (τ0, τ0))
by a standard calculation. But now V is negative definite on the orthogonal
complement of (1, 1, 1) and λ(τ) is as above so we have 2U(τ, τ) ≤ 2U(σ, σ)
with equality only if τ = σ, proving that σ is an ES strategy and so also an
ESSet.
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